Disclosure of corporate tax reports, tax enforcement, and price information
Caballé, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Dumitrescu, Ariadna (Universitat Ramon Llull. Escola Superior d'Administració i Direcció d'Empreses Esade)

Date:	2020
Abstract:	This paper analyzes the effects of disclosing corporate tax reports on both financial markets' performance and tax revenue. To this end, we characterize the optimal auditing policy of the tax enforcement agency and the optimal tax reporting strategy of a _rm. The manager of the firm has the possibility of trading in the firm's stock and, therefore, he cares about the information disclosed through the tax report. Our analysis suggests that, despite disclosure of the tax reports being beneficial for market performance (as the spread is smaller than under no disclosure), the tax agency might have incentives to not disclose the tax report when its objective is to maximize expected net tax collection. We also draw empirical and policy implications about the effect of the tax agency's efficiency on both trading costs and net tax collection. Our results shed light on the debate about the costs and benefits of disclosure.
Grants:	European Commission 649396 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-1765
Note:	Altres ajuts: FEDER/PGC2018-094364-B-I00
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Subject:	Disclosure ; Corporate tax ; Feedback effects of prices
Published in:	Journal of banking and finance, Vol. 121 (Decembre 2020) , ISSN 0378-4266

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105978

Postprint 42 p, 679.5 KB

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