The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures
Bannikova, Marina (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Jelnov, Artyom (Ariel University. Department of Economics and Business Administration)
Jelnov, Pavel (Leibniz University. Institute of Labour Economics)

Date:	2021
Abstract:	This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1-5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
Note:	Altres ajuts: COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Voting ; Legislature ; Lobbyist ; Parties
Published in:	Games, Vol. 12 Núm. 4 (december 2021) , p. 76, ISSN 2073-4336

DOI: 10.3390/g12040076

10 p, 340.4 KB

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