Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal)
Suzumura, Kotaro (Waseda University)

Imprint:	Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019
Description:	29 pàg.
Abstract:	Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-83534-P Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-0711
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Language:	Anglès
Series:	BSE working paper ; 1107
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Voting rules ; Daunou's method ; Condorcet criterion
Published in:	BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/daunous-voting-rule-and-lexicographic-assignment-priorities

29 p, 333.4 KB

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