Resolving information asymmetries in financing new product development : The case of reward-based crowdfunding
Sewaid, A. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada)
Garcia-Cestona, Miguel (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Empresa)
Silaghi, Florina (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Empresa)

Data:	2021
Resum:	Reward-based crowdfunding has evolved as a significant alternative source of financing for new product development over the past years. Unlike traditional investors, reward-based crowdfunding investors financing the production process are essentially consumers pre-ordering the product. Since financing takes place prior to production, this context is prone to information asymmetries. Consumers financing new product development have incomplete information regarding the quality of the product they have pre-ordered and the reward they will receive for their early support. We draw on information economics to examine how signals, such as price commitment, discount, and reward classes, play a role in conveying information about product quality and the financial reward backers receive for pre-ordering the product. Our empirical analysis covers detailed hand-collected information on a random sample of 1835 Kickstarter campaigns. We find that signaling information regarding the future retail price enhances campaign performance. Moreover, when the different signals originate from the same source and overlap in the information they convey, the more informative signals partially offset the effect of the less informative signals.
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Publicat a:	Research Policy, Vol. 50 Núm. 10 (2021) , ISSN 1873-7625

DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2021.104345

Disponible a partir de: 2025-01-01

El registre apareix a les col·leccions:
Articles > Articles de recerca
Articles > Articles publicats