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Página principal > Documentos de investigación > Working papers > A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games |
Publicación: | Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2005 |
Descripción: | 10 pàg. |
Resumen: | We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. |
Derechos: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Lengua: | Anglès |
Colección: | BSE working paper ; 248 |
Documento: | Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
Materia: | Coalition formation ; Hedonic game ; Stability |
Publicado en: | BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2005 |
10 p, 205.3 KB |