A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Gerber, Anke (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Grup de Recerca Coalicions, Incentius i Xarxes en la Presa de Decisions Col·lectives)
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Imprint:	Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2005
Description:	10 pàg.
Abstract:	We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	BSE working paper ; 248
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Coalition formation ; Hedonic game ; Stability
Published in:	BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2005

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/note-impossibility-satisfactory-concept-stability-coalition-formation-games

10 p, 205.3 KB

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Research literature > Working papers