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A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games - Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Gerber, Anke (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Grup de Recerca Coalicions, Incentius i Xarxes en la Presa de Decisions Col·lectives) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
 
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