Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Coelho, Danilo

Publicació:	Barcelona: BSE Working Paper; 2024
Descripció:	36 pàg.
Resum:	We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially con. icting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two con. icting . rms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition. s selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the e¢ ciency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their e¤ectiveness hinges on the parties. preferences over the sets containing the required number of candidates to be chosen.
Ajuts:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación CEX2019-000915-S Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-116771GB-I00
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Col·lecció:	BSE working paper; 1442
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Matèria:	Appointing Arbitrators ; Appointing Judges ; Rule of k Name ; Split Appointment Rules ; Compromise ; Unanimity Compromise Set ; Top Compromise
Publicat a:	BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2024

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/mechanisms-appoint-arbitrator-panels-or-sets-judges-compromise-between

36 p, 303.8 KB

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