| Date: |
2019 |
| Abstract: |
This paper analyzes the extent to which selection explains the observed discrepancy between solicited and unsolicited ratings. I propose a model of selection with truth telling rating agencies and borrowers with the ability to veto the revelation of the rating. The observed difference between the two categories of ratings in different sectors is in line with the prediction of the model. In the sovereign market there is a positive selection of borrowers into unsolicited ratings whereas other sectors have, on the contrary, lower unsolicited rating grades than those solicited. |
| Rights: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.  |
| Language: |
Anglès |
| Document: |
Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
| Subject: |
Ancillary services ;
Rating agencies ;
Sovereign debt ;
Unsolicited ratings |
| Published in: |
Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Vol. 7 Núm. 2 (2019) , p. 1950005, ISSN 2282-717X |
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