The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
Bannikova, Marina (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel, 1981- (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

Date:	2022
Abstract:	This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline-a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
Grants:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-119152GB-I00 Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2016-75410-P Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-86481-P
Note:	Altres ajuts: Universitat Rovira i Virgili and Generalitat de Catalunya under Projects 2018PRF-URV-B2-53
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Sequential voting ; Fixed ordering ; Alternate ordering ; Subgame perfect equilibrium
Published in:	Games, Vol. 13 Núm. 6 (November 2022) , p. 77, ISSN 2073-4336

DOI: 10.3390/g13060077

8 p, 261.1 KB

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