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Date: | 2016 |
Abstract: | This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction. |
Grants: | Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2013-48496-C4-4-R |
Rights: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Language: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar |
Subject: | Autonomy ; Monitoring ; Wages and organisation design |
Published in: | Journal of economics & management strategy, 2016 , ISSN 1530-9134 |
Postprint 49 p, 260.2 KB |