Autonomy and monitoring
Barrenechea-Méndez, Marco A. (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Ortín Ángel, Pedro 1968 (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Rodes, Eduardo C. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Data:	2016
Resum:	This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2013-48496-C4-4-R
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Matèria:	Autonomy ; Monitoring ; Wages and organisation design
Publicat a:	Journal of economics & management strategy, 2016 , ISSN 1530-9134

Adreça alternativa: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.12164/abstract
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12164

Postprint 49 p, 260.2 KB

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