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Resultados globales: 9 registros encontrados en 0.03 segundos.
Artículos, Encontrados 5 registros
Documentos de investigación, Encontrados 4 registros
Artículos Encontrados 5 registros  
1.
41 p, 433.1 KB On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina))
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. [...]
2020 - 10.1016/j.jet.2020.104992
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 186 (2020) , p. 104992  
Registro completo - Creative Commons
2.
Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules : Local and weakly single-peaked domains / Bonifacio, Agustín G. (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Pablo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina))
We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. [...]
2023 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 106 (Mai 2023) , p. 102845-21  
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3.
53 p, 597.0 KB On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness / Bonifacio, Agustín G. (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. [...]
2020 - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 124 (2020) , p. 219-238  
Registro completo - Creative Commons
4.
42 p, 422.0 KB On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness / Catterji, Shurojit (Singapore Management University) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). [...]
2017 - 10.1111/iere.12266
International economic review, 2017  
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5.
19 p, 213.5 KB Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 61 Núm. 2 (November 2007) , p. 331-343  
Registro completo -

Documentos de investigación Encontrados 4 registros  
1.
35 p, 279.5 KB Identifying strong voter support : Condorcet and Smith revisited / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa) ; Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal)
The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. [...]
Barcelona : Barcelona School of Economics, 2023 (BSE working paper ; 1380)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2023  
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2.
39 p, 312.0 KB On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness / Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy- proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica 2019 (Working papers ; 967.19)  
Registro completo - Creative Commons
3.
39 p, 340.5 KB On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness / Bonifacio, Agustín G. ; Massó, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmic; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica 2019 (Working papers ; 965.19)  
Registro completo - Creative Commons
4.
30 p, 259.5 KB On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi ; Chatterji, Shurojit
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2015 (Working papers ; 952.15)  
Registro completo - Creative Commons

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