On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
Arribillaga, Pablo R. (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis)

Data: 2014
Resum: We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability, and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related to the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated with the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of matrices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.
Drets: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. Creative Commons
Llengua: Anglès.
Document: article ; recerca ; publishedVersion
Matèria: Assignment game ; Competitive equilibrium ; Core ; Group stability
Publicat a: Journal of applied mathematics, 2014 , ISSN 1687-0042

21 p, 2.0 MB

El registre apareix a les col·leccions:
Articles > Articles de recerca
Articles > Articles publicats

 Registre creat el 2015-09-17, darrera modificació el 2018-10-28

   Favorit i Compartir