Home > Articles > Published articles > Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes |
Date: | 1999 |
Abstract: | We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme. |
Grants: | Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad PB96-1192 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 1996-SGR-75 |
Note: | We thank Dolors Berga, Arunava Sen, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Científica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of S. Barberà and J. Massó is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR96-75 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya. |
Rights: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Language: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió |
Published in: | Social choice and welfare, Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (1999) , p. 321-336, ISSN 0176-1714 |
Preprint 21 p, 235.4 KB |