An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia)
Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)

Date:	2007
Abstract:	We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
Rights:	Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Subject:	Voting ; Committees ; Undominated Nash Equilibrium
Published in:	Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 54 Núm. 2 (September 2007) , p. 152-175, ISSN 0165-4896

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004

32 p, 277.3 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Articles > Research articles
Articles > Published articles