| Data: |
2018 |
| Resum: |
This paper characterizes the optimal bailout maturity structure for a sovereign on the verge of a default. I find that buying back long-term debt is strictly optimal when it can prevent a default today and in the future. Otherwise, buying back short-term debt is optimal and can prevent a default only today. The paper also investigates the choice of debt maturity structure of the sovereign in the presence of bailouts. I find that potential bailouts extend the sovereign's borrowing capacity and make it rely more on debt with shorter maturities on average. As short-term debt is vulnerable to rollover crises, it generates more default risk. Eventually, the paper analyses how potential bailouts affect ex post welfare and studies ex ante welfare-improving policies. |
| Resum: |
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
| Ajuts: |
European Commission 649396
|
| Drets: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.  |
| Llengua: |
Anglès |
| Col·lecció: |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series |
| Col·lecció: |
ADEMU Working Paper Series ; 127 |
| Document: |
Working paper |
| Matèria: |
Sovereign debt ;
Bailouts ;
Maturity structure ;
Risk |
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