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Pàgina inicial > Articles > Articles publicats > Indirect tax harmonization and global public goods |
Data: | 2014 |
Resum: | This paper identifies conditions under which, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium, destination- and origin-based indirect tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially Pareto improving in the presence of global public goods. The first condition (unrequited transfers between governments) requires that transfers are designed in such a way that the marginal valuations of the global public goods are equalized, whereas the second (conditional revenue changes) requires that the change in global tax revenues, as a consequence of tax harmonization, is consistent with the under/over-provision of global public goods relative to the (modified) Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization results in redistributing the gains from a reduction in global deadweight loss and any changes in global tax revenues according to the Pareto principle. And this is the case independently of the tax principle in place (destination or origin). |
Ajuts: | Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2009-10003 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-37572 |
Nota: | Financial support from the Catalan Government Science Network (2009SGR and XREPP) and the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science Research Project (ECO2009-10003) is gratefully acknowledged. |
Drets: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Llengua: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar |
Matèria: | Origin principle ; Destination principle ; Indirect tax harmonization ; Reform of commodity taxes ; Global/local public goods |
Publicat a: | International tax and public finance, Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (February 2014) , p. 29-49, ISSN 0927-5940 |
Postprint 27 p, 264.3 KB |