Should the rich be taxed more? the fiscal inequality coefficient
Hatgioannides, John (City University of London)
Karanassou, Marika (Queen Mary University of London)
Sala Lorda, Hector (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Publicació: Londres Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance 2017
Descripció: 16 pag.
Resum: This paper holistically adresses the effective (relative) income tax contribution of a given income (or wealth) group. The widely acclaimed standard in public policy is the absolute benefaction of a given income group in filling up the fiscal coffers. Instead, we focus on the ratio of the average income tax rate of an income group divided by the percentage of national income (or wealth) appropiated by the same income group. In turn, we develop the Fiscal Inequality Coefficient wich compares the effective percentage income tax payments of pairs of income (or wealth) groups. Using data for the US, we concentrate on pairs such as the Bottom 90? versus Top 10%, Bottom 99% versus Top 1% and Bottom 99. 9% versus Top 0. 1%. We conclude that policy makers with strong social conscience should re-evaluate the progresivity of the income tax system and make the richest echelons of the income and wealth distributions pay a fairer and higher tax.
Ajuts: Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2016-75623-R
Drets: Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Llengua: Anglès
Col·lecció: Working Paper Series, (School of Economics and Finance) ; 832
Document: Working paper
Matèria: Fiscal policy ; Progressive income taxation ; Inequality ; Effective income tax rate ; Fiscal inequality coefficient
ISBN: 1473-0278

Adreça alternativa: https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/184783


16 p, 1.2 MB

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Documents de recerca > Working papers

 Registre creat el 2021-01-26, darrera modificació el 2025-04-13



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