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| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties |
| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties |
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)| Imprint: | Barcelona: BSE Working Paper; 2024 |
| Description: | 36 pàg. |
| Abstract: | We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially con. icting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two con. icting . rms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition. s selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the e¢ ciency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their e¤ectiveness hinges on the parties. preferences over the sets containing the required number of candidates to be chosen. |
| Grants: | Agencia Estatal de Investigación CEX2019-000915-S Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-116771GB-I00 |
| Rights: | Tots els drets reservats.  |
| Language: | Anglès |
| Series: | BSE working paper; 1442 |
| Document: | Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
| Subject: | Appointing Arbitrators ; Appointing Judges ; Rule of k Name ; Split Appointment Rules ; Compromise ; Unanimity Compromise Set ; Top Compromise |
| Published in: | BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2024 |
