The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations
Rialp Criado, Josep (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa)
Salas Fumás, Vicente (Universidad de Zaragoza. Facultad de Economía y Empresa)
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Empresa

Imprint:	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa 2000
Abstract:	This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from "contracts" to "hierarchies" has been ignored in the past and with it the so called "costs of ownership". The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i. e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa. Documents de treball
Series:	Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa) ; 00/1
Document:	Working paper
Subject:	Empreses ; Direcció i administració ; Models matemàtics

41 p, 127.3 KB

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Research literature > Working papers > Department of Business. Working papers