Individual versus group strategy-proofness : when do they coincide?
Barberà, Salvador, 1946-
Berga, Dolors
Moreno, Bernardo
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Date: 2009
Description: 31 p.
Abstract: A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the.
Rights: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús Creative Commons
Language: Anglès.
Series: Working papers
Series: Working papers ; 761.09
Document: workingPaper
Subject: Elecció social

Adreça alternativa: https://hdl.handle.net/2072/14540


32 p, 330.9 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers

 Record created 2009-07-15, last modified 2019-02-02



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