Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information - Search Results

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20 p, 607.8 KB

Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information / Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. [...]
2012 - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423

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20 p, 277.0 KB

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information / Clippel, Geoffroy de ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 813.10)

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