In Google we trust?
Burguet, Roberto
Caminal, Ramon
Ellman, Matthew
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica

Imprint: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013
Description: 35 p.
Abstract: In a micro-founded model, we derive novel incentives for a monopoly search engine to distort its organic and its sponsored results on searches for online content and offline products. Distorting organic results towards content publishers with less effective display advertising and/or distorting sponsored results towards higher margin merchants (by underweighting consumer relevance in search auctions) increase per capita revenues but lower participation. The interplay of these incentives determines search bias and welfare. We also characterize how the welfare consequences of integration into display advertising, as intermediary or publisher, depend on asymmetries, monopolization and targeting.
Rights: L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: Creative Commons
Language: Anglès.
Series: Working papers
Series: Working papers ; 935.13
Document: workingPaper
Subject: Internet ; Aspectes econòmics ; Search engine bias ; Internet economics ; Vertical integration ; Two-sided markets ; Antitrust

Adreça alternativa: https://hdl.handle.net/2072/250495


35 p, 599.1 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers > Fundamentals Unit of the Economic Analysis. Working papers

 Record created 2015-06-02, last modified 2019-12-17



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