| Imprint: |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 |
| Description: |
36 p. |
| Abstract: |
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view. |
| Rights: |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons:  |
| Language: |
Anglès |
| Series: |
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers |
| Series: |
Working papers ; 940.13 ; Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 740 |
| Document: |
Working paper |
| Subject: |
Assignment game ;
Competitive equilibrium ;
Core ;
Group stability |
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