Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Arribillaga, R. Pablo
Massó, Jordi
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Imprint: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2014
Description: 44 p.
Abstract: We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilat- erally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Rights: L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: Creative Commons
Language: Anglès.
Series: Working papers
Series: Working papers ; 946.14
Document: workingPaper
Subject: Generalized Median Voting Schemes ; Strategy-proofness ; Anonymity ; Vot -- Models matemàtics

Adreça alternativa: https://hdl.handle.net/2072/253857


44 p, 336.8 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers

 Record created 2015-09-08, last modified 2019-02-02



   Favorit i Compartir