On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Martínez, Ruth (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis)
Oviedo, Jorge (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis)
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Publicació: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2009
Descripció: 27 p.
Resum: We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference pro. les into subsets with the property that all preference pro. les in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a pro. le of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference pro. les with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Llengua: Anglès
Col·lecció: Barcelona economics working papers series; 390
Document: workingPaper
Matèria: Acoblament, Teoria de l' ; Matching ; Core

Adreça alternativa: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/390.pdf

27 p, 263.7 KB

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 Registre creat el 2015-10-27, darrera modificació el 2017-10-14

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