On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))

Data:	2012
Resum:	We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.
Ajuts:	Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009-SGR-419 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2008-04756 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación 2010CDS2006-00016
Nota:	We are very grateful to Flip Klijn, an anonymous referee and an associate editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank participants of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona "Bag Lunch Workshop on Game Theory and Social Choice" and of the Duke Conference "Roth and Sotomayor: Twenty Years Later" for comments and suggestions. The work of R. Martínez, A. Neme, and J. Oviedo is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis through grant 319502 and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas through grant PICT-02114. Support for the research of J. Massó was received through the prize "ICREA Acadèmia" for excellence in research, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. He also acknowledges the support of MOVE (where he is an affiliated researcher), of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (where he is an affiliated professor), and of the Goverment of Catalonia, through grant SGR2009-419. His work is also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consolidado-C) and CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016).
Nota:	Altres ajuts: CONICET/PICT-02114
Nota:	Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502
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Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Matèria:	Jocs, Teoria de ; Matching ; Core
Publicat a:	Games and economic behavior, Vol. 74 Núm. 2 (March 2012) , p. 588-600, ISSN 0899-8256

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.011

Preprint 26 p, 248.5 KB

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