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Página principal > Artículos > Artículos publicados > Sequential coalition formation through bilateral agreements in a cournot setting |
Fecha: | 2006 |
Resumen: | We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient. |
Ayudas: | Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología BEC2003-01132 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología BEC2000-0172 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2005/SGR-00836 |
Derechos: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Lengua: | Anglès |
Documento: | Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar |
Materia: | Coalition formation ; Bilateral agreements ; Cournot |
Publicado en: | International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 (2006) , p. 207-228, ISSN 0020-7276 |
Postprint 29 p, 1.1 MB |