Resultados globales: 7 registros encontrados en 0.02 segundos.
Artículos, Encontrados 2 registros
Documentos de investigación, Encontrados 5 registros
Artículos Encontrados 2 registros  
1.
42 p, 1.3 MB Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts / Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás (Universidad Pablo Olavide)
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. [...]
2014 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.013
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 86 (2014) , p. 145-164  
2.
29 p, 1.1 MB Sequential coalition formation through bilateral agreements in a cournot setting / Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás (Universidad Pablo Olavide. Departament d'Economia)
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. [...]
2006 - 10.1007/s00182-006-0017-6
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 (2006) , p. 207-228  

Documentos de investigación Encontrados 5 registros  
1.
41 p, 384.9 KB Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets / Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 872.11)  
2.
29 p, 271.1 KB Optimal regulation of specialized medical care in a mixed system / Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the optimal public intervention in setting minimum standards of formation for specialized medical care. The abilities the physicians obtain by means of their training allow them to improve their performance as providers of cure and earn some monopoly rents. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 465.00)  
3.
28 p, 408.1 KB Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation / Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study a problem of adverse selection in the context of environmental regulation, where the firm may suffer from a certain degree of ignorance about its own type. In a framework like the construction of a certain infrastructure project, the presence of ignorance about its impact on the environment, can play an important role in the determination of the regulatory policy. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 491.01)  
4.
26 p, 306.1 KB Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements / Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 515.02)  
5.
65 p, 484.8 KB Economies with externalities: regulation and incentives / Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Macho-Stadler, Inés, dir. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
La tesis consta de tres capítulos independientes en los que aplico técnicas de Organización Industrial y de Teoría de Juegos (tanto cooperativos como no cooperativos) a distintas interacciones económicas En todos los problemas que se estudian, el elemento esencial para el análisis es la presencia de externalidades. [...]
The thesis consists of three independent chapters where I apply tools of Industrial Organization and of Game Theory (both cooperative and non-cooperative) to different economic interactions. In all the problems I study, the essential element for the analysis is the presence of externalities. [...]

Bellaterra : Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002
3 documentos

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