On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Chatterji, Shurojit (Singapore Management University)
Serizawa, Shigehiro (Osaka University of Economics)

Data:	2025
Descripció:	23 pàg.
Resum:	We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.
Ajuts:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-116771GB-I00 Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2023-147183NB-I00 Agencia Estatal de Investigación CEX2019-000915-S Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2021/SGR-0194
Nota:	Altres ajuts: Singapore Ministry of Education, under the grant MOE 2016-T2-1-168 ; Osaka University, and from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, under the grants 20H05631, 20KK0027, 21H00696, and 22H00062
Drets:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Matèria:	Multi-dimensional single-peakedness ; Strategy-proofness
Publicat a:	Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 150 (2025) , p. 48-70, ISSN 1090-2473

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017

23 p, 835.4 KB

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