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| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Preventive health care and payment systems to providers |
(Universidade Nova de Lisboa) (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica)| Date: | 2006 |
| Description: | 25 p. |
| Abstract: | Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care. |
| Rights: | Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.  |
| Language: | Anglès |
| Series: | Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers |
| Series: | Working papers ; 507.02 |
| Document: | Working paper |
| Subject: | Preventive health care ; Payment systems to providers ; Medicina preventiva ; Aspectes econòmics ; Política sanitària |
