guest ::
| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues |
| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues |
| Date: | 2011 |
| Description: | 32 p. |
| Abstract: | We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment. |
| Rights: | Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús  |
| Language: | Anglès |
| Series: | Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers |
| Series: | Working papers ; 880.11 |
| Document: | Working paper |
| Subject: | Externalitat (Economia) ; Jocs, Teoria de |
