visitant ::
identificació
|
|||||||||||||||
Cerca | Lliura | Ajuda | Servei de Biblioteques | Sobre el DDD | Català English Español |
Pàgina inicial > Articles > Articles publicats > Double-spending prevention for Bitcoin zero-confirmation transactions |
Data: | 2019 |
Resum: | Zero-confirmation transactions, i. e. transactions that have been broadcast but are still pending to be included in the blockchain, have gained attention in order to enable fast payments in Bitcoin, shortening the time for performing payments. Fast payments are desirable in certain scenarios, for instance, when buying in vending machines, fast food restaurants, or withdrawing from an ATM. Despite being quickly propagated through the network, zero-confirmation transactions are not protected against double-spending attacks, since the double-spending protection Bitcoin offers relies on the blockchain and, by definition, such transactions are not yet included in it. In this paper, we propose a double-spending prevention mechanism for Bitcoin zero-confirmation transactions. Our proposal is based on exploiting the flexibility of the Bitcoin scripting language together with a well-known vulnerability of the ECDSA signature scheme to discourage attackers from performing such an attack. |
Ajuts: | Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad TIN2014-55243-P Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014/SGR-691 |
Drets: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Llengua: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar |
Matèria: | Bitcoin ; Blockchain ; Cryptocurrency ; Double-spending ; ECDSA |
Publicat a: | International Journal of Information Security, Vol. 18, Issue 4 (August 2019) , p. 451-463, ISSN 1615-5270 |
Postprint 14 p, 7.1 MB |