Legitimacy, communication and leadership in the Turnaround game
Brandts, Jordi (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica)
Cooper, David J. (Florida State University. Department of Economics)
Weber, Roberto A. (University of Zurich. Department of Economics)
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Imprint: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2014
Description: 62 p.
Abstract: We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i. e. , a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group's outcome than randomly selected ones. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observed that a combination of factors- incentive increases and elected leaders-yield near universal turnarounds to full efficiency.
Rights: L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: Creative Commons
Language: Anglès.
Series: Working papers
Series: Working papers ; 947.14
Document: workingPaper
Subject: Lideratge ; Selecció de personal ; Experiments ; Leadership ; Communication ; Coordination Failure ; Job Selection

Adreça alternativa: https://hdl.handle.net/2072/253858

62 p, 2.6 MB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers > Fundamentals Unit of the Economic Analysis. Working papers

 Record created 2015-09-08, last modified 2019-12-17

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