Legitimacy, communication and leadership in the Turnaround game
Brandts, Jordi (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica)
Cooper, David J. (Florida State University. Department of Economics)
Weber, Roberto A. (University of Zurich. Department of Economics)
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Imprint:	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2014
Description:	62 p.
Abstract:	We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i. e. , a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group's outcome than randomly selected ones. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observed that a combination of factors- incentive increases and elected leaders-yield near universal turnarounds to full efficiency.
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers
Series:	Working papers ; 947.14
Document:	Working paper
Subject:	Lideratge ; Selecció de personal ; Experiments ; Leadership ; Communication ; Coordination Failure ; Job Selection

62 p, 2.6 MB

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Research literature > Working papers > Fundamentals Unit of the Economic Analysis. Working papers